




zadacima i obavezama obaveštajno-bezbednosnog sektora, policije i vojske, 
medicinskog i veterinarskog sektora, kao i donosilaca odluka prvorazredni 
nacionalni zadatak, uz obezbe ivanje adekvatnih ljudskih i materijalnih 
resursa i uspostavljanje me unarodne saradnje u ovoj oblasti. U radu su 
predstavljena naša iskustva i lekcije iz velikih epidemija koje su se dešavale 
kod nas u razli itim istorijskim periodima, poput epidemije tifusa koji je u 
vreme Prvog svetskog rata naneo ogromnu štetu srpskoj vojsci i narodu, epi-
demija variole 1972. godine koja se smatra najve om epidemijom u 
posleratnoj Evropi, kao i epidemije tularemije na podru ju nekadašnje 
Jugoslavije krajem 90-tih godina prošlog veka. Izaziva i svih navedenih 
bolesti mogu se koristiti i kao biološki agensi. 
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Criminal Policy on Corporate Criminal Liability – Different 
Theoretical Approaches 
Abstract: The article focuses on different theoretical approaches to-
wards establishing corporate criminal liability in national legislatures. Cor-
porate crime is a serious criminal phenomenon, which produces high level of 
social danger in many fields – economy and trade, health and safety at work-
place, environmental protection, human rights and others. Introducing crimi-
nal liability of legal persons in most of contemporary legislatures has opened 
theoretical debates in various academic disciplines, such as criminal law, 
criminology, sociology and social psychology, economic science and others. 
As a significant criminological discipline, criminal policy is supposed to ana-
lyze arguments pro et contra corporate criminal liability as an instrument of 
prevention and combat against corporate and other forms of white-collar 
crime. The central part of the article examines different theoretical views and 
arguments on efficiency and justification of legislative measures towards 
corporate crime phenomenon. The author stresses economical, sociological 
and corporate cultural aspects of introducing and implementing criminal 
liability of legal persons. The author aims to shed light on different dimen-
sions of the matter, pointing to interdependency of various aspects.  
 
Keywords: Corporate Criminal Liability, Criminal Policy, Corporate 
crime. 
Introduction 
Corporate crime is a serious criminological problem, which has as-
sumed international proportions and uncovered serious shortcomings of the 
traditional criminal justice instrumentation. Criminal law, however, has to be 
in accordance with social reality and open to changes in order to perform its 
basic functions. Criminal policy, on the other hand, has to give an answer to 
the question how efficient and valuable certain legal solutions, as well as 
whether they are in accord with basic social values and moral principles. In 
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this sense, criminal justice, as a means of criminal policy, performs protec-
tive, guaranteeing and socio-ethical function. (Radulovi , 1999: 87, 89).   
Criminal justice policy of reducing criminality implies establishing ba-
sic goals of criminal law and judiciary; defining principles upon which crimi-
nal law is established; reforming criminal law in accordance with require-
ments of criminal policy regarding decriminalization and depenalization; 
determining criteria for establishing that certain behaviors are socially dan-
gerous and punishable; directing activities of judiciary; studying and evalua-
tion of the elements of criminal justice policy for criminality reduction. 
(Milutinovi , 1984: 145, 146). 
Subjects of criminal policy are nowadays, bearing in mind all the 
stated tasks of criminal justice which has to reduce criminality as well as the 
seriousness of corporate criminality problem, facing an important task – 
finding adequate instruments to confront the problem that wasn’t addressed 
properly in the past, and whose dimensions were not completely taken into 
consideration. (Stojanovi  et al., 2010: 25, 26; Simovi -Hiber, 2007: 84, 85). 
Besides the fact that legal persons perpetrate crimes, which seems 
indisputable, there is still a question what criminal policy measures (above 
all, actions of legislative bodies) represent the most adequate reaction. The 
basic dilemma is whether it is better to introduce the institution of corporate 
criminal liability or adhere to traditional criminal justice categories which 
acknowledge only the individual and subjective criminal liability. Even if the 
dilemma is solved in favor of the former, there is still the question of 
corporate liability legal nature as well as the sanction system which can be 
used for collective entities as perpetrators of crimes.  
According to various normative solutions in comparative law, there are 
three basic principles: introducing corporate criminal liability accompanied 
by sanctions adjusted to its nature; introducing corporate administrative 
liability for crimes; sanctioning torts only by means of civil law sanctions. 
(Miloševi , 2012: 44).        
Selecting one of the offered models depends on the nature of both 
internal (constitutional and legal principes in the sphere of criminal law) and 
international law (especially respecting obligations arising from international 
conventions), as well as from adopting crime policy arguments that support 
them (Miloševi , 2014: 40). There are various ideas in theory about whether 
and why it should be decided to punish collective entities, and at the same 
time there are opposing answers to the question what crime policy effects 
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Effects of deterrence and just compensation – the impact of crimi-
nal sanctions 
Basic criminal policy arguments for introduction of criminal corporate 
liability are effects of deterrence it leads to and an adequate social “label-
ing” of perpetrators. (Miloševi  et al., 2015: 208). In that sense, bearing in 
mind that the general purpose of criminal sanctions in modern criminal jus-
tice systems is general and special prevention, and that criminal sanctions 
system is developed and well-established, designed in order to efficiently 
achieve basic goals of criminal policy, introducing the possibility to punish 
companies which commit crimes proves itself to be a logical and appropriate 
solution. (Radulovi , 1999: 96). 
In addition to that, criminal sanctions are stricter than any other legal 
sanctions and they are a more proportional reaction to grave consequences 
caused by corporate crimes. Criminal sanctions are ultima ratio and their 
imposition is justified only when it is necessary to protect people and other 
social values and to the extent necessary (Stojanovi , 2012). This means that 
corporation criminality has been estimated by the subjects of criminal policy 
as a criminal act which to a great extent jeopardizes basic civil rights and 
liberties, so that it is completely legitimate to decide to impose criminal 
sanctions against legal persons. Besides, recorded cases of crimes committed 
on behalf of and for the benefit of corporations both worldwide and in our 
country support these arguments. (Banovi  et al., 2014: 1251, 1252). 
In addition to that, effects of resocialization are greater than in case of 
conventional criminality due to the fact that legal person can change and 
reorganize itself more easily than an individual under the influence of the 
imposed criminal sanction. So, both general and special prevention are at-
tainable goals of corporate torts incrimination. A corporation as an entity 
cannot be reduced to a mere sum of individuals who comprise it, so punish-
ing an individual instead of an entity proves itself to be inappropriate. Fi-
nally, the restitution to victims and wider social community is, thanks to eco-
nomic capacities of corporations, a real goal of criminal policy. (Braithwaite: 
1985, 290, 291; Geis, DiMento: 1995, 76, 77). 
The literature recorded an example of the American Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) which heavily relied on civil penalties for violation 
of environmental protection regulations by corporations up to 1982. By 
means of using legal basis for criminal sanctions and thanks to changes in 
personnel (introduction of crime investigators), EPA brought about more 
frequent and stricter punishing of legal persons (and other pollutants) for 
committing torts. The result of higher criminalization of pollution acts was 
the following: the total amount of fines paid as sanctions for environmental 
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pollution was $198 thousand in 1984, while in 1989, several years after the 
change in “criminal policy” - $1.1 million. (Simpson: 2002, 16, 17).  
The final stated argument does not necessarily prove the necessity for 
introducing corporate criminal liability, because sometimes damages can be 
obtained through civil penalties. Still, criminal sanctions are perhaps more 
efficient instrument than civil penalties. Wells emphasizes that criminal sanc-
tion is used as a foundation for establishing property claim thus making it 
more likely to obtain damages than in case when damages claim is made only 
through civil procedure. (Wells: 2001, 17). On the other hand, if we observe 
from the perspective of compensating a wider social community which is 
often an indirect or a direct corporate criminality victim, criminal sanctions 
provide a more appropriate compensation mechanism because apart from 
compensating specific damage they also enable compensation, at least to 
some extent, of social cost of their criminal activities via certain activities 
such as community service. Such restitution is more realistic if a sanction is 
imposed on legal person instead of natural person. Corporate criminality 
produces greater damage to the society than criminality of an individual, but 
at the same time the possibility of reduction and elimination of its conse-
quences by means of criminal sanction is also greater.    
Social cost of corporate criminality and proportional effects of 
criminal sanctions 
The starting point of the approach which takes into consideration the 
economic cost of corporate criminality is the idea that stricter criminal sanc-
tions and their regular imposition will have a greater effect on crime rate 
reduction. In this case, a formula according to which the severity of a sanc-
tion should depend on the relationship between social cost of a criminal ac-
tivity and the probability of detection, in order to deter a company from in-
volvement in crime. Considering the fact that social cost of corporate crimi-
nality is, historically, far greater than prescribed punishments, vicarious li-
ability of legal persons should be introduced and far stricter sanctions im-
posed that would fit into the already mentioned formula and produce deter-
rent effects. (Arlen, 1994: 833 - 835). 
There is an interesting approach according to which corporate criminal 
liability is the best possible replacement for individual criminal liability of 
corporate agents who are actual perpetrator and beneficiaries of a crime, but 
whose liability is hard to prove. The starting point of this hypothesis is that 
the corporation itself will as a consequence “punish” its agents after the state 
imposes a criminal sentence on it. This means that a corporation discards 
actual perpetrators or reduces their salaries due to business losses resulting 
from paying high fines. (Arlen, 1994: 835). Fisse has a contrasting argument. 
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posed that would fit into the already mentioned formula and produce deter-
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There is an interesting approach according to which corporate criminal 
liability is the best possible replacement for individual criminal liability of 
corporate agents who are actual perpetrator and beneficiaries of a crime, but 
whose liability is hard to prove. The starting point of this hypothesis is that 
the corporation itself will as a consequence “punish” its agents after the state 
imposes a criminal sentence on it. This means that a corporation discards 
actual perpetrators or reduces their salaries due to business losses resulting 
from paying high fines. (Arlen, 1994: 835). Fisse has a contrasting argument. 
He believes that criminal sanctions against a corporation do not lead to a 
desired effect – developing inner disciplinary system in corporations which 
would result in internal sanctioning. By analyzing benefits and shortcomings 
of different approaches, the author emphasizes that one of key strategies is 
“designing” provisions so that they efficiently affect development of internal 
sanctioning system. (Fisse, 1995: 378-386). Corporate criminal liability is, in 
this sense, justified as the way of achieving an indirect effect of reducing 
white-collar crime. 
A concept according to which a corporation is a superindividual entity 
whose guilt can be determined independently of individual liability can be 
used as an argument for introducing corporate criminal liability, although it is 
more oriented towards proving that the model of autonomous criminal liabil-
ity of a collective entity is optimal. ( ur evi , 2003: 741). According to this 
standpoint, a situation like this is possible: criminal liability for a particular 
premeditated crime requires establishing the existence of the intention which 
includes three elements (A, B, C). It is possible that the element A is known 
to a member of the corporation, the element B to another, and the element C 
to the third, with the difference being that the second and third member are 
not aware that there is the element A.  
In literature we find the opinion that the fact that it is possible to find 
an autonomous basis for corporate criminal liability, is a strong criminal pol-
icy argument in favor of the hypothesis that it is necessary and legitimate to 
punish a corporation as an individual entity with its own liability. If it would 
be decided in favor of the system of punishing individual perpetrators exclu-
sively, the deterrent effect would be significantly lesser than in the system of 
corporate criminal liability. The author explains this by stating that determin-
ing individual criminal liability, although potentially poses a greater risk to a 
specific individual because they face a possible serious prison sentence or a 
fine, is less probable, so that it does not have such deterrent effect in com-
parison to corporate criminal liability which is, especially in the system of 
autonomous criminal liability of a collective entity, easier to determine, and it 
consequently leads to a probability of internal disciplinary penalty against a 
manager who did not respect prescribed measures and regulations. There is 
an important criminal policy argument which is implied in the fact that it is 
often very difficult to determine not only the identity of a perpetrator but also 
the actual beneficiaries of illegal profits and who are, in many cases, master-
minds behind criminal actions (or at least instigators, or perhaps, tacit benefi-
ciaries aware of the illegality of obtained profits). The author gives a good 
example for already analyzed problem of internal sanctioning persons which 
are held accountable. He states that the experience in cases of environmental 
crime shows that actual perpetrators and those who order environmental 
crimes are junior and middle managers because making short-term and 
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“swift” decisions about pollution of, for example, a local stream or water 
flow, or, emission of toxic industrial substances into the air, remains at their 
level of responsibility and usually does not reach the board of directors. The 
result would be that the manager gets fired, loses reputation and practically 
any possibility to find a job in that industry in future. (Coffee, 1998: 10 – 18). 
Paternoster and Simpson emphasize that the decision on potential in-
volvement in crime depends on three factors: prescribed sanctions, moral 
inhibitions and organizational factors. They think that in cases in which 
members of a collective have strong moral principles, the probability of in-
volvement in criminal activities is lesser. So-called cost/benefit analysis is 
concluded by the idea that the cost of criminal activity is too high. When 
moral inhibitions are weaker, the role of the imposed sanction becomes 
greater and it turns into the main deterrent factor (together with organiza-
tional factors). Authors conclude that it is necessary that criminal policy im-
plies instrumental (threat with a sanction) and deontological factors (appeal 
to moral values, raising moral awareness of potential crime actors). (Pater-
noster et al., 1996: 549). The role of moral perception as an crime prevention 
factor is also considered in connection with other types of white-collar crime. 
(Mrvi -Petrovi , 2013: 15). 
Factors of sentence severity, sanction certainty and selective im-
plementation of provisions 
A very serious argument against implementation of corporate criminal 
liability can be observed in the problem of insufficient protection of corpora-
tion personnel not responsible for the committed crime, but has to suffer the 
consequences of attributing guilt to the whole collective entity. Here the au-
thor states an effective metaphor by Bierce about a corporation as a “profit 
maximization and responsibility minimization machine”. A good example to 
illustrate negative consequences of such an approach is the case of EF Hutton 
and Co., a brokerage company which performed a large-scale fraud in which 
400 banks suffered loss. The company accepted plea bargain and paid $2.75 
million, but no manager was held responsible for this crime although the US 
Department of Justice found that there was basis for charges against two 
managers. (Fisse, 1995: 382). 
Bearing in mind that criminal law implies socio-ethical function which 
requires that it should be used not only as a reaction to a committed offence, 
but also as a very important means of raising awareness about what behaviors 
are socially undesirable and inacceptable from the standpoint of basic ethical 
principles, letting individuals who are not directly involved in crime suffer 
from the consequences of criminal sanctions seems paradoxical. Ethical im-
perative of punishing crime perpetrators in this case means indirectly punish-
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Bearing in mind that criminal law implies socio-ethical function which 
requires that it should be used not only as a reaction to a committed offence, 
but also as a very important means of raising awareness about what behaviors 
are socially undesirable and inacceptable from the standpoint of basic ethical 
principles, letting individuals who are not directly involved in crime suffer 
from the consequences of criminal sanctions seems paradoxical. Ethical im-
perative of punishing crime perpetrators in this case means indirectly punish-
ing “the innocent”, thus practically undoing positive ethical effects. Also, it is 
not a rare case of “transferring” liability to those who are placed at a lower 
corporate hierarchical level, in order to avoid liabilities of the management 
and the legal person itself. The impact of corporate cultural aspects on poten-
tial corporate criminal conduct is also interesting field of research. (Kekovi  
et al., 2011; Ljuština, 2013; Petrovi  et al., 2012). This is an inherent trend in 
societies such as British which are based on the identification theory, so that 
actions of employees cannot be attributed to the corporation even if they have 
been performed for its benefit and as part of business activities. 
Braithwaite concludes that criminal law in itself is not an ideal instru-
ment for solving corporate crime problem, and that the process of negotiating 
between regulatory bodies (the state) and corporations is a key strategy and 
that criminal law is an instrument which is supposed to serve as a strong ne-
gotiating argument in the hands of the regulators – the ultimate sanction 
which can be implemented if a corporation refuses other possibilities offered 
in the negotiation process. He believes that the main aim of regulatory bodies 
should be developing efficient mechanisms of internal control within corpo-
rations. (Braithwaite, 1984: 290). The similar opinion is expressed by some 
other researchers (Gruner, 2007). 
Simpson thinks that corporate criminal liability system has not 
achieved expected effects. In the first place, the effect of general prevention 
by means of deterrence of potential perpetrators (legal persons, that is, their 
managers) with strict criminal sanctions failed to produce the expected re-
sults. The author offers a number of theoretical explanations for the failure of 
Criminal Las in the field of corporate crime. Firstly the fine amounts are in-
adequate (powerful companies do not regard it as a serious threat since they 
are financially dominant), and at the same time the probability that a crime 
would be detected is small. Mild penalties together with a low percent of 
sanction certainty lead to comparatively minimal preventive effect of crimi-
nal policy. Numerous data testify about comparatively mild punitive crime 
policies against corporate crime. Thus, 89% out of 228 corporations con-
victed of crime before the US courts in the period between 1984 and 1987 
were fined to pay the amount of $53,974 on the average. 16% of these com-
panies were ordered to pay damages, whose average amount was $239.987. 
Proceedings against corporation are lengthy and include a great num-
ber of mutually interconnected actors which makes it difficult to detect a 
crime. The fact that position of the victim is often different than in other 
types of crime, because victimization process is not so obvious (for example, 
environmental crimes), and direct consequences are hard to prove, leads to 
the situation in which the reaction of the victim as basis for starting appropri-
ate formal mechanisms in a great number of cases either comes too late or 
does not come at all. There is also the problem of performing the efficient 
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corporate cases investigation, because standard investigative instrumentation 
which is used in cases of conventional crimes is not appropriate for detecting 
corporate crimes. Police officers are trained to investigate conventional 
crimes, and they often do not have investigative skills necessary for unveiling 
crimes perpetrated by complexly structured corporations. Finally, selectivity 
in implementation of crime regulations by the authorities leads to the situa-
tion that criminal proceedings against the most powerful corporations are 
rarely initiated. (Simpson, 2002: 45 – 61; Stotland, 1982).  
Research carried out by Adler and Lord proved the existence of sig-
nificant selectivity on the part of state agencies. They studied implementation 
of criminal justice regulations in the field of environmental crime and con-
cluded that until 1984, there were no criminal proceedings initiated against 
some of the biggest corporations in the USA. In the period between 1984 and 
1989, only 6% out of the total number of processed companies was from the 
group of 500 most powerful corporations in the USA. In the total sum of 
corporations against which there were any criminal proceedings for environ-
mental crimes (until 1991, when Adler and Lord’s article was published) so-
called Fortune 500 corporations (500 of the richest corporations) were repre-
sented with 1.6%. A strong contrast to these data is the fact that these 500 
corporations produce about 54% national income from non-agricultural (in-
dustrial) business. (Adler et al., 1991: 796) 
Shortcomings of criminal law instrumentation and factors of 
organizational structure and business risk estimates 
From the perspective of certain authors criminal law is an inadequate 
mechanism for confronting corporate crime. In this case a difference is made 
between crimes which are mala in se and those which are mala quia pro-
hibita. Thus, in case of the former delict category, whose immorality is indis-
putable, criminal law is an adequate mechanism because the social condem-
nation of such crimes is unanimous. Still, so called regulatory offenses, for 
which corporate agents are usually held responsible according to Anglo-
American law, represent the latter category of delicts, whose immorality is 
disputable. In case of such criminal behaviors, the efficiency of criminal law 
depends on perception of its legitimacy. When norms according to which 
certain business practices are forbidden are considered unjustified, deterrent 
effects of criminal sanctions will be low.  
Although, on one hand, it is shown that mild punitive policy in a way 
“encourages” corporate criminality, on the other hand, punishments which 
are too severe lead to similar undesirable effects – “closing down” companies 
for fear of potentially high fines for cooperation with investigation authori-
ties; resorting to mechanisms such as bankruptcy/insolvency in order to avoid 
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mechanism for confronting corporate crime. In this case a difference is made 
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putable, criminal law is an adequate mechanism because the social condem-
nation of such crimes is unanimous. Still, so called regulatory offenses, for 
which corporate agents are usually held responsible according to Anglo-
American law, represent the latter category of delicts, whose immorality is 
disputable. In case of such criminal behaviors, the efficiency of criminal law 
depends on perception of its legitimacy. When norms according to which 
certain business practices are forbidden are considered unjustified, deterrent 
effects of criminal sanctions will be low.  
Although, on one hand, it is shown that mild punitive policy in a way 
“encourages” corporate criminality, on the other hand, punishments which 
are too severe lead to similar undesirable effects – “closing down” companies 
for fear of potentially high fines for cooperation with investigation authori-
ties; resorting to mechanisms such as bankruptcy/insolvency in order to avoid 
liability; transferring production of illegal goods to other countries, etc. 
Those possibilities result in “transferring” the effects of high fines from cor-
porations to their customers. (Simpson, 2002: 52). Braithwaite also agrees 
with this, and emphasizes that, in cases where the financial cost of strict regu-
lation implementation is too high, it is not realistic to expect that a company 
will act in agreement with legal norms. (Braithwaite, 1985: 125). 
Certain research studies deny the hypothesis that deterrent effect of 
criminal sanctions is greater in comparison with other types of sanctions. 
Simpson and Copper analyzed 38 cases of corporations which were convicted 
of violating antitrust law, in the period between 1928 and 1981, in order to 
investigate whether the implemented sanctions affected reduction of possibil-
ity of recidivism. They observed several variables simultaneously – sanction 
certainty, sanction severity, sanction basis (civil, criminal or administrative 
law), market changes, economic situation, “criminal opportunities” and moti-
vation. The results of the research show that criminal and civil law sanctions 
have a greater effect than those based on administrative law. The study 
proved that sanction severity is a stronger recidivism inhibitor in comparison 
with sanction certainty and “promptness”. In addition to that, the study came 
to a conclusion that cultural and economic climate (“criminal opportunities”, 
motivation etc.) which surrounded companies, triggered criminal activities 
which overcame the deterrent effects of other factors. (Simpson et al, 1992: 
370 – 375). 
Studies show that data processing in collective entities has some im-
portant specificities. Thus, within a group decision-making process all par-
ticipants behave differently than they would behave when they decide for 
themselves. Factors which prevent an individual to decide to commit a crime 
do not have the same effect in the process of risk estimation process in a 
group. Simpson believes that the individual perception of risk changes and 
adapts to the group dynamics, so that most of corporate decisions about 
committing a crime is a consequence of group decision-making which cannot 
be reduced to a simple mathematical sum of individual wills. In that way, the 
deterrent effect which would occur in cases of certain actors disappears in the 
process of collective decision-making. (Simpson, 2002: 53).  
The example for this Simpson finds in General Dynamics, as it was ac-
cused for fixing tenders several times during the 1950s. She concludes that 
marketing and sales managers of the company were prone to deviant subcul-
ture, while other departments of the company, probably, operated in accor-
dance with the law. Moore thinks that strict criminal sanctions are more like-
ly to lead to undesired results, than to positively affect corporate crime deter-
rence, and he suggests turning to alternative ways of legal control of corpora-
tions. (Moore, 1987: 379 – 402). 
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Risk calculations performed by corporations greatly differ depending 
on numerous external factors. Although there is a hypothesis that corpora-
tions which are not financially stable are more prone to violating regulations 
than those which are financially stable, Yaeger states that various studies do 
not offer basis for this conclusion. Research studies shed light on the fact that 
companies with good business results engage in criminal activities less often 
that those with bad business results, and also that corporations operating in 
the most developed ad profitable industries commit illegal acts more fre-
quently than the two previously mentioned groups. The author concludes that 
external factors of risk evaluation, such as predicting global or national future 
economic trends or state factors reaction, as well as social factors such as 
deviant subculture shape the process of corporate decision-making and con-
sequently lead to a modest deterrent effect of criminal sanctions. State regula-
tions achieve better results in preventing and combating corporate crime by 
indirectly influencing cultural and corporate ethics norms of company mem-
bers than by sanction threat. (Yaeger, 2007: 29).    
Conclusion 
Analysis of the basic characteristics of corporate crime has led us to 
the conclusion that it is, even when it is focused on the acquisition of corpo-
rate profits, has always as the resultant white-collar crime, because the bene-
fits of it necessarily leads to a particular physical entity. This type of crime is 
necessarily determined by the desire for material gain, which is formally 
expressed by increasing the assets of the legal person as a fictitious entity, but 
is essentially materialized through profit maximization of individuals who 
stand behind the mask of ‘collectivity’. (Miloševi  et al., 2015: 211). Crimi-
nal policy, therefore, should aim to unveil the real nature of corporate crime, 
and develop measures that will lead to efficient crime prevention.  
Summarizing all the arguments pro et contra,  we can conclude that 
criminal law is not the only instrument of corporate crime prevention, but 
also have in mind that seriousness and social danger of some forms of corpo-
rate crime definitely justify imposing the criminal sanctions on legal persons.  
Radulovi  correctly concludes that in modern societies the awareness about 
the necessity of initiating the process of combating crime, and that suppress-
ing criminogenic determinates and that overall results of criminal policy 
largely depend on the success in this field. (Radulovi , 1999: 41).  Therefore, 
if a state does not undertake serious socio-preventive measures in order to 
affect corporate crime causes, introducing the possibility of imposing crimi-
nal sanctions, as well as their implementation, will not lead to desired results. 
In addition to this, it should also be stated that a systematical legislative ap-
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the necessity of initiating the process of combating crime, and that suppress-
ing criminogenic determinates and that overall results of criminal policy 
largely depend on the success in this field. (Radulovi , 1999: 41).  Therefore, 
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Kriminalnopoliti ki aspekti odgovornosti pravnih lica za 
krivi na dela – razli iti teorijski pristupi 
 
Apstrakt: Rad se bavi razli tim teoretskim pristupima vezanim za utvrdji-
vanje odgovornosti pravnih lica za krivi na dela u nacionalnom zakono-
davstvu. 
Kriminalitet korporacija predstavlja ozbiljnu kriminalnu pojavu koja izaziva 
visok stepen društvene opasnosti u mnogim oblastima – odražava se na eko-
nomiju i trgovinu, zdravlje i bezbednost na radnom mestu, ekološku zaštitu, 
ljudska prava i drugo. Uvodjenje krivi nopravne odgovornosti pravnih lica u 
ve inu savremenih zakona otvorilo je teorijske debate u okviru razli itih aka-
demskih disciplina, kao što su krivi no pravo, kriminologija, sociologija i 
socijalna psihologija, ekonomske i druge nauke. Kao važna kriminološka 
disciplina, kriminološka politika treba da se bavi analizom argumenata pro 
et contra odgovornosti pravnih lica za krivi na dela kao instrumenta za pr 
venciju i suzbijanje korporativnog i drugih vidova privrednog kriminala. 
Centralni deo rada istražuje razli ite teorijske poglede i argumente vezane za 
efikasnost i opravdanost zakonodavnih mera uperenih protiv pojave korpora-
tivnog kriminala. Autor naglašava ekonomske, sociološke i korporativno-
kulturne aspekte uvodjenja i utvrdjivanja krivi ne odgovornosti pravnih lica. 
Cilj autora jeste da prikaže razli ite dimenzije ove teme i ukaže na njihovu 
medjusobnu povezanost. 
Klju ne re i: odgovornost pravnih lica za krivi na dela, politika, kriminalitet 
korporacija.
              
